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THE NEW WAGE-HOUR ACT*
By MARTIN CONBOY, Member of the New York Bar
HE proposal to have wages and hours fixed by agencies
under the authority of the Federal government constitutes about the farthest removal from what has been
called the horse and buggy era that has thus far come under
contemplation. To account for it, regardless of whether the
measure is good or bad, constitutional or unconstitutional, we
are obliged to realize that it has something to do with a change
in the pattern of society, for at a time well within the memory
of many of us no one would have even dreamt of such a
recourse.
It was my privilege to deliver an address on this subject
to the Federation of Bar Associations of the Fifth Judicial District at its annual meeting on September 24th.
ECONOMIC DEPRESSION

There is a vast flood of literature on the subject of how
best to effect recovery from conditions identified with the economic depression of recent years. A feature common to all of
them is the acceptance of conditions now found to prevail.
There is a depression problem in agriculture. There is one in
transportation. There is one in industry. There is one in
labor. There is one in unemployment. Seldom, it is to be
noticed, does anyone stop to inquire how the unsatisfactory
conditions have come about, and still less often does anyone
seek to relate what has happened in one division to what has
happened in the others.
The fact probably is that at the time the changes were
becoming effective not much attention was paid to them in a
general way. They came about in periods of fairly uniform
prosperity, during which only the good side of them invited
more than passing notice. For more than that, everyone was
too busily engaged. It was only when the momentum lessened
that reasons were sought for the void that suddenly appeared.
CAUSE AND EFFECT

And yet it is plain that cause and effect are not to be separated. There have been similar dislocations before this one.
For example, the lordly mansions that adorned the great
*Courtesy of Mt. Conboy and the New York State Bar Association Bulletin.
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southern plantations in the first half of the last century were
built upon extensive cultivation of tobacco and cotton. Production rested upon the forced labor of negro slaves. Distribution and the resultant fortunes rested with demand overseas,
mainly in England. Under the dual threat of freeing the
slaves and of endangering the foreign market by setting up
high tariffs against the manufactures of the country that
bought most of the cotton and tobacco, the Union itself was
placed in imminent danger, with war as the final instrument of
political policy. The conditions contributing to prosperity,
in that instance, were altered by unsuccessful war, and war was
followed by half a century or more of inability to recover from
the losses that had been sustained in what was the richest portion of the continent.
AGRICULTURE

In the half century after the Civil War, the industrial development in England made that country the principal customer for all the wheat the United States could spare from its
own wants, the prairies were opened, and the railroads derived
from the increased output perhaps the main impulsion to their
spread. Now we have a different situation, and both the
wheat producers and the railroads are in trouble.
Agriculture is, as a whole, affected by a different sort of
change. In the beginning of our civilization the land was the
immediate source of sustenance for all, and all participated in
the effort to make it productive. Concern was for the product
of the homestead. We have gone from that to a situation in
which all the varieties of soil and of climate are at the service
of every consumer. Those of us who go by motor car into the
farm areas near the great cities are offered the privilege of buying, from local stands, what are supposed to be the produce of
the neighborhood, but are actually in many instances, those of
Georgia, California or Colorado. And in the process of change
the proportion of the population actually engaged in agriculture has been subject to continuous reduction.
INDUSTRY

We seldom stop to think that in the beginnings of manufacturing industry there was a relation to the agricultural element that long ago disappeared. The farmers' sons and
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daughters added something to the family income by the work
they did, at certain seasons, in the mills. At a slightly later
stage, the mill, and its more or less steadily employed staff, was
part of an entity of which the small town and the adjacent
rural area were also parts. This phase still continues in, for
example, sections of Connecticut, and yet the great number of
abandoned farms in that state bears witness to the decision
ultimately reached to abandon agriculture and depend upon
the rewards to be had from service in the mills or in the commerce attendant on industrial development. In the larger
cities, there was no nexus with the soil. The adjunct to the
work in the factory was the work sent out to be done in the
homes.
NEw DEVELOPMENTS

The depression problem, as it relates to industry, consists
in there being less work to be done in the factories, and no
work at all for a varying ratio of those who have no experience
in any other kind of productive effort. Their number is out
of all proportion to that which would have had to be provided
for in any of the earlier phases. Moreover, in the stage of
development when agriculture was an adjunct of industry the
families of those out of employment could share with them
the products of the soil and assure them of shelter. In the
present condition neither the one nor the other resource is
available.
There are two further aspects of the change that invite
attention. One is that the progress of invention has contributed to the creation of new industries, of which the motor
car and the radio are examples, and has brought them to the
peak of their possibilities of output, and then beyond their
possibilities of employment. The creation of other new industries has not been rapid enough to take up the slack. The
second is that, just as agriculture, transportation, industry
have increased in volume, so have they ceased to be local. The
tendency has been for all of them to adapt themselves to the
governing circumstance that in habits, tastes, outlook, we are,
as a Supreme Court decision once put it, "all one people."
Bands of farm laborers follow the harvest from state to state
nowadays, whereas in the long ago the utmost effort of the
kind was neighborly interchange of help. Grocery and other
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stores under one management are found from coast to coast.
The same fashions in clothes are followed in Indianapolis and
Seattle as in New York. And those who are out of work are
out of the same kinds of work, everywhere, if they ever have
been employed, or unable to find employment in the same
range of employments if they have just completed school and
are seeking to provide for themselves.
SOLUTION PROBLEMATICAL

WI-at is always important, and never to be lost sight of,
is that all these changes, imperceptible as they occurred, or at
any rate accepted without apprehension of disagreeable consequences, came about through the free play of initiative, courage, industry in the sense of continuous application, on the
part of individuals seeking the rewards appropriate to their
individual capacities. And what has led to whatever complication there may. be associated with the legislation now under
consideration is that, for the time being at least, the reliance
hitherto placed upon the effectiveness of this system is no
longer. available to those who have been let down as the whole
complex has slowed down. There are those who hold that
adjustment will be effected, that the mass intelligence will
find a mass answer to the problem. But it is plain that great
numbers of those to whom the answer is not patent find themselves under the necessity of asking the government to produce a more immediate solution of the difficulty. Demand has
been made upon Congress to that effect, and the Act now under
consideration is the present answer of Congress to part of that
demand. By specifying the number of hours one may work
per week, it seeks to increase the number of employed. By
naming a minimum wage, it seeks to set a minimum standard
of subsistence for those who are employed. And it adopts,
at least for the time being, the view that the people, who. are
the government, can mitigate the evil into which the people,
as participants in the process of improvement through the
sum of individual effort and initiative, have been precipitated,
whether by their own incapacity or by conditions in the world
outside over which they have no control.
FAIR LABOR ACT AN APPROACH

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 is an approach
to the problem insofar as it concerns factory output, whether
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within the walls or outside them, and whether, in fact, the
groupment of men or women in a common effort demands
such enclosure. Six months ago the President approved the
Act, generally called the Wage-Hour Law, which was passed
by Congress in June and which went into effect October 24th.
The President has described the law as fixing a floor below
wages and a ceiling above hours of labor and as putting an end
to child labor. It is obvious, therefore, that the practical
effects which the law may have on the American economic system may be very great but that is a subject which falls within
the domain of economics rather than of law and I leave it to
the economists.
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

The statute involves important constitutional questions
which must be of interest to lawyers. In order to view the
constitutional questions involved a brief outline of the principal provisions of the Act are referred to.
One section fixes a minimum wage to be paid to employees engaged in commerce (meaning interstate commerce)
and in the production of goods for commence. The minimum
rate is 25c per hour during the first year; 30c per hour during
the next six years; and 40c per hour thereafter. The 40c rate
is subject to the power of the Administrator appointed by the
President to establish a lower rate (not less than 30c per hour
in industries where circumstances warrant it).
Another section of the Act provides that no employee
shall work more than a certain number of hours per week
(the number finally gets down to 40) unless he is paid overtime wages.
Another section provides that
"No producer, manufacturer, or dealer shall ship in interstate commerce any goods produced in an establishment situated anywhere in the
United States in or about which any oppressive child labor has been
employed."

These are the three provisions which, I assume, the President had in mind when he described the effect that the law
would have.
Of course, minimum wage and maximum hour legislation and the prohibition of child labor are not innovations of
the year 1938.
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The first protective legislation in England was the Health
and Morals Act to Regulate Labour of Bound Children in
Cotton Factories, sponsored by Sir Robert Peel and adopted in
1802. This Act forbade the binding out of children younger
than nine years, restricted the hours to twelve actual working
hours a day, and prohibited night work. (3 Ency. Social
Sciences, P. 414).
There has, of course, been continuing enlargement of
the scope of labor legislation in Great Britain since that time.
Under the British Trade Boards Acts of 1909 and 1918, the
Minister of Labor was empowered to fix minimum wages.
Congress gave recognition to the eight hour day by making it compulsory on all contractors upon public works of the
United States (Acts of August 1, 1892 and of March 3, 1913;
40 U. S. C., 321-3), and for employees of carriers engaged in
interstate and foreign commerce (Act of September 3-5, 1916;
45 U. S. C., sec. 65).
NEW YORK STATE LAWS
The amended Constitution of this State passed by the
Constitutional Convention last Summer and adopted by the
voters at the general election of 1938 contains this new section
in Article I, Bill of Rights, taken from Article 8 of the Labor
Law:
"Section 17 * * * No laborer, workman or mechanic, in the
employ of a contractor or sub-contractor engaged in the performance of
any public work, shall be permitted to work more than eight hours in
any day or more than five days in any week, except in cases of extraordinary emergency; nor shall be paid less than the rate of wages prevailing
in the same trade or occupation in the locality within the state where
such public work is to be situated, erected or used."

Article 5 of our Labor Law entitled "Hours of Labor"
contains numerous provisions with reference to hours of labor
of operators of motor vehicles and motor buses, state employees, children under sixteen, females over sixteen, females
over eighteen in sauerkraut canneries, minors between sixteen
and eighteen in certain kinds of business; females on street
railroads and male minors and females in telegraph or messenger service.
By Section 69-a of the General Business Law of this
State, added by Laws of 1937, Chapter 806, in effect January
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1, 1938, the sAle of goods produced by child labor is prohibited. The term "child labor" is defined as employment of
persons under sixteen years of age. (Section 69-b).
Article 8 of the Labor Law, as we have observed, fixes
hours of work and wages on public works and Section 220d
requires that the advertised specifications for every contract for
the construction, etc., of public work shall state the minimum
hourly rate of wages which can be paid to those employed in
the performance of the contract.
Assuming that our social and economic needs require
legislation of this character to overcome evils against which
these laws are addressed, our system of dual governmental
authority and the constitutional doctrine of delegated powers
raise a peculiar difficulty, so far as federal legislation is concerned by which England and even the states of the Union are
not affected.
CONGRESSIONAL POWER

Granting that the need for the legislation exists, has the
Federal Congress, which speaks territorially for the entire
nation but, in domestic matters, under powers delegated by
the states, authority to enact laws of this character? It can
be very plausibly argued that the whole field of economic
legislation can, in view of the nationwide character of even
local enterprises, be efficiently handled only by the federal
government.
This is the theory which lies back of the finding of Congress:

* * the existence, in industries engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental
to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for
health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers (1) causes commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce to be used
to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the workers of the
several states; (2) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method of competition in commerce:
(4) leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of goods in commerce; and (5) interferes with the orderly
and fair marketing of goods in commerce."
"*

And it is the declared policy of the Act:
* * through the exercise by Congress of its power to regulate
commerce among the several states, to correct, and as rapidly as prac"*
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ticable, to eliminate the conditions above referred to Cin such industries
without substantially curtailing employment or earning power."

If, as in many other instances where the federal government has intervened, the several states had, through their own
legislatures, employed the power of regulation, the need of
federal action would not be so apparent.
Goods produced in a state whose legislature has neglected
or refused to place restrictions upon what we may, for the sake
of argument, call oppressive labor conditions, have an advantage over goods produced in other states. The protection of
American goods from unfair competition by nations having
lower labor standards is one of the reasons for our protective
tariffs.
If any state legislature is disinclined to pass a particular
piece of social legislation no outside influence, even of the
federal government, can change its attitude.
It is not my purpose to discuss the question whether the
fixing of maximum hour and minimum wage standards and
the prohibition of child labor are desirable ends to be accomplished, and I am not taking the position that such ends can
be accomplished only by means of federal legislation.
The point with which we are chiefly concerned as lawyers, and the one I take to be of most interest is: Now that
Congress has acted and passed the legislation, can its validity
be sustained under the Constitution? In other words, what
is the Supreme Court going to do with it? I am not going to
predict the result but I shall attempt to outline some of the
constitutional objections which are certain to be raised before
the law passes the final test. This will require a very interesting consideration of the history of the Court's decisions as
to what constitutes interstate commerce under the commerce
clause, and what constitutes due process of law under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
The handle that opened the door to the passage of the
Law and the basis for justifying Congress' control over the
matter is found in the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution:
"The Congress shall have power

*

*

*

to regulate commerce

with foreign nations and among the several states and with thL Indian
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By the terms of the Law, regulation of wages and hours of
employees and the prohibition of child labor are confined to
employees "engaged in Commerce or in the production of
goods for Commerce," and commerce is defined in the. Act as
meaning "trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or
communication among the several states or from any state to
any place outside thereof." It is obvious that if the Act were
limited to employees engaged in actual commerce between the
states its effect would be confined largely to the business of
transportation and there is no real doubt but that the field so
limited would be a proper one for Congressional regulation.
SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE

The Employee's (Hours of Service) Act of 1907 fixing
maximum hours of continuous work for railroad employees
engaged in interstate transportation was sustained by the
Supreme Court in 1911 in Baltimore and Ohio R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612, where Mr.
Justice Hughes said:
"The length of hours of service has direct relation to the efficiency
of the human agencies upon which protection of life and property
,necessarily depends,"

and the Court held that inasmuch as Congress had acted
within the interstate commerce field there could not be denied
to it the exercise of its constitutional authority.
The validity of the Adamson Act (45 U. S. C., sec. 65),
which established an eight-hour day for employees of carriers
engaged in interstate and foreign commerce, was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, and in
Ellis v. United States, 206 U. S.246, the court held that the
Act of August 1, 1892, prescribing an eight-hour day on
public works (40 U. S. C., s. 321) was not repugnant to the
Federal Constitution.
The important feature of the Wage-Hour Law as a departure from previous legislation, is that it is made expressly
applicable to "the production of goods for commerce.
Twenty years ago the court held that the authority of
Congress under the commerce clause might not be extended to
control interstate commerce in the products of child labor; in
the words of the court:
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"*
* * the mere fact that they (the goods) were intended for
interstate commerce transportation does not make their production subject to federal control under the commerce power * * *. Over interstate transportation, or its incidents, the regulatory power of Congress
is ample, but the production of articles intended for interstate commerce,
is a matter of local regulation."
(Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S.
251, 272).

Every argument for permitting Congress to prohibit interstate transportation of goods produced by child labor was
considered in that case and held to be of no avail in face of the
fact that the making of goods was not "commerce." Mr.
Justice Holmes, in his dissenting opinion, argued that "Regulation means the prohibition of something, and when interstate commerce is the matter to be regulated * * * the
regulation may prohibit any part of such commerce that Congress sees fit to forbid."
(247 U. S. at p, 277). The states
could regulate their internal affairs and their domestic commerce as they saw fit but when they sought to send their
products across the state lines they were no longer within
their rights and Congress might carry out its view of public
policy whatever indirect effect that might have upon the
activities of the states. (ibid, p. 281 ).
The prevailing opinion, however, expressed the doctrine
which the court had followed on many previous occasions.
And this view persisted as late as 1936 when the court
decided that the Guffey Act regulating the bituminous coal
industry was unconstitutional and held that manufacturing,
lumbering and mining processes constituted intrastate production and were beyond the power of Congress to regulate.
(Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238). A decision of
the court, so recent as May 16, 1938, calls the manufacture of
goods "a purely intrastate activity" even when they are sold
in interstate commerce (J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304
U. S. 307 at p. 313).
In 1935 one of the court's grounds for holding the N. I.
R. A. unconstitutional was that the activities of the persons
therein involved, wholesale dealers in poultry, which had been
shipped in interstate commerce, were not subject to regulation
by Congress because they were neither transactions in nor acts
relating to interstate commerce.
(Schecter Poultry Co. v.
United States, 295 U. S. 495).
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I have just stated the doctrine prevailing in the court
prior to its 193 7 decisions under the National Labor Relations
(Wagner) Act in which the court, so it seems to me, departed
from the views that it had so long held.
WAGNER ACT AND COURT ATTITUDE

The decisions of the court in the Wagner Act cases indicate that the power of Congress under the commerce clause
extends to relations between employers and their employees
engaged in manufacturing to the extent necessary to protect
interstate commerce. Logically, therefore, the constitutionality of the Wage-Hour Law in its application to the production of goods for commerce must be based upon the views of
the court in the Wagner Act cases, rather than on the prior
decisions of the court.
It is not too much to say that the doctrine expressed in
Hammer v. Dagenhart must be overruled or greatly limited,
if it has not already been so limited, to sustain the law in its
application to employees "engaged in the production of goods
for commerce."
The effect of the change in the attitude of the court as to
the extent of the regulatory power of Congress under the interstate commerce clause may be observed in the record of the
debate in the Senate the day the bill was passed. [Congressional Record, June 14, 1938, p. 12043 ]:
"Mr. Glass: Mr. President, I want to ask a very simple question
of the constitutional lawyers who differ so widely in their interpretation
of the Constitution. I should like one of them to define for me what
constitutes interstate commerce. Specifically in order to keep out of
jail, I should like to ask them if I am engaged in interstate commerce in
publishing two newspapers because of the fact that I buy my newsprint
in Maine or some other state, or because I purchased my newspaper press
from New Jersey, or because I am compelled to buy my type, when I
buy type, from some other state? Am I engaged in interstate commerce?
"Mr. Borah: Does the newspaper circulate in several states?
"Mr. Glass: Let me ask the other questions now which these constitutional lawyers may be able to answer: What constitutes actual
interstate commerce? Suppose I have a newspaper with 20,000 subscribers and all of the papers circulate in Virginia except to ten subscribers. Am I engaged in interstate commerce?
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"Mr. Borah: Mr. President, if the Senator is purchasing his goods
for the purpose of making up his newspaper in different states and he
takes them to a particular place where he uses them and he transmits his
newspapers into other states-I do not think the number-the number
10, 20, or 30 is controlling. I think the Senator is engaged in interstate
commerce.
"Mr. Glass: Well, I do not.
"Mr. Wheeler: Well, if I may interrupt the Senator from Idaho,
I will say to the Senator from Virginia that twenty years ago he would
not have been engaged in interstate commerce but if he is not considered
to be engaged in interstate commerce now, he will be considered to be
engaged in interstate commerce ten years from now because the law will
be so changed and the courts will finally come to the conclusion that he
is engaged in interstate commerce.

Three of the Wagner Act cases at the 1936 October Term
involved employers whose business was manufacturing. One
of the employers was a clothing manufacturer whose one
establishment was located in Richmond, Virginia. A large
portion of the material which went into the clothing was
shipped in from other states and 85% of the company's products was sold in other states, but the activities of the employees
took place entirely within the State of Virginia. In determining that the relations between the employer and his employees
were subject to regulation by Congress, the court considered
not only the activities of the employer involved but the industry as a whole, quoting a finding of the Labor Board that:
"The men's clothing industry is thus an industry which is nearly
entirely dependent in its operations upon purchases and sales in interstate
commerce and upon interstate transportation."

In the Jones Z4 Laughlin Steel Corporation case [301
U. S. 1 ] it appeared that the corporation was engaged in the
manufacture of steel in Pennsylvania, receiving its raw materials from and selling its products in other states and the court
held that, under the commerce clause, Congress had power
to regulate the relations between the corporation and its employees, including those whose activities were confined to intrastate manufacturing. Through the Chief Justice the court
expressed the view [301 U. S. 37] that:
"Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately
considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that
commerce from burdens and obstfuctions, Congress cannot be denied
the power to exercise that control."
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The court's decision in the Wagner Act cases indicates
that the production of goods to be shipped in interstate commerce is subject to federal regulation in order to prevent labor
disputes burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow
of commerce.
WAGE AND HOUR REGULATION

It will be remembered that the "Adamson Act" (45 U.
S. C. §65) was passed at the instance of President Wilson to
avert a strike of the four railway brotherhoods. (Burke v.
Monumental Division, No. 52 Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers,273 Fed. Rep. 707).
Does the power of regulation extend beyond the prevention of labor disputes? Is it necessary for the protection of
interstate commerce to give Congress power to fix wages and
hours and to prohibit child labor in the production of goods
for commerce? This is the primary question of constitutional
power which the court must answer. Of course, in every case
there will also be a question of fact,-"Are the employees engaged in the production of goods for commerce?"
Along with the question whether Congress has power to
enact laws applicable to intrastate activities, justified only
upon the basis of the interstate commerce clause, run other
constitutional questions arising under the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment. Statutory regulation of the number of hours that a man may work, and of the amount of
wages that a man must be paid, and statutory prohibition of
the employment of children are, in a sense, limitations upon
or deprivations of freedom of contract, and deprivation of
liberty, including liberty to contract, is forbidden by the Fifth
Amendment, if without due process of law.
I assume that Congress has just as broad powers to legislate on matters committed to it by the Constitution as do "the
states in their sovereign capacity touching all subjects jurisdiction of which is not surrendered to the federal government"
and it seems clear that Congress can in the exercise of the police
power incidental to its delegated powers do in its proper field
what the states can do in theirs. Assuming then that the field
is one in which Congress has power to legislate by reason of
the interstate commerce clause, is the legislation justified under
the police power by the need to protect the health and welfare
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of workers engaged in the production of goods for commerce?
In the finding and declaration of policy contained in the
Act the case for regulation is stated by Congress in terms that
have sustained state laws regulating wages and hours:
"The Congress hereby finds that the existence, in industries engaged
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living
necessary for health, efficiency and well being of workers * * * (2)
burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce. * * *
(5) interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce.

On the question whether the Act is justified under the
police power the court's decisions dealing with the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of similar state
laws are, therefore, important.
HOURS OF LABOR

In Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, the court held,
in 1905, that a New York statute fixing maximum hours of
labor for bakery employees was not, as to men, a legitimate
exercise of the state's police power, but an unreasonable interference with the right and liberty of the individual to contract
in relation to his labor and as such in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. "
Subsequently, however, the court sustained the constitutionality of a statute limiting the work hours of women,
[Muller v. Oregon (1908) 208 U. S. 412], distinguishing
Lochner v. New York on the ground that women were involved. The decision may be said to have been based upon
infirmities inherent in sex, and the court, referring to woman,
said
"Differentiated by these matters from the other sex, she is properly
placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her protection
may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary for men and
could not be sustained."

Similar legislation where women were involved was sustained
in Riley v. Massachusetts,232 U. S. 671 (in factories) ; Miller
v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373 (in hotels); Bosley v. McLoughlin,
236 U. S. 385 (in hospitals); and the New York statute
which restricted the employment of women in restaurants at
night. Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292.
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Furthermore, in Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426, the
court, in 1917, sustained an Oregon law limiting the hours of
work of employees in manufacturing establishments without
regard to the sex or age of the employee, thereby implicitly
reversing Lochner v. New York.
The justification for such statutes now seems to be that
they are health regulations passed in exercise of the state's
police power to safeguard the health of workers.
If a state may limit hours of labor as a health regulation
without violating the Fourteenth Amendment, may not Congress do the same thing in the field of interstate commerce
without violating the Fifth?
MINIMUM WAGES

The Supreme Court's treatment of minimum wage statutes, in one respect at least, has not paralleled that fixing hours
of employment. The court held in 1923 in Adkins v. Childrens Hospital [261 U. S. 525 ], that a law passed by Congress fixing minimum wages for women employed in the District of Columbia was in violation of the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment, Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting. Noting
the court's frequent approval of state statutes fixing minimum
work hours for women he was moved to comment that he did
not "understand the principle on which the power to fix a
minimum of wages for women can be denied by those who
admit the power to fix a maximum for the hours of work."
Despite adverse criticism the authority of the Adkins case
was recognized as controlling for fourteen years and in 1936
a New York minimum wage law for women was held unconstitutional in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298
U. S.587.
About eight months later, however, the court held valid
the Washington minimum wage statute for women in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish [ 300 U. S.379 ] and overruled the
Adkins case, stating that "the decision in the Adkins case was
a departure from the true application of the principles governing the regulation by the state of the relations of employer and
employed." The challenge to the validity of the distinction
made by the Adkins case between minimum wages and maximum hours so far as concerned the limiting of liberty of contract was successful.
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There has been, so far as I am aware, no case before the
court involving the validity of a statute fixing minimum
wages for men. This is apparently an undetermined matter.
Classification on the basis of sex with regard to hours of work
seems no longer to be the rule. Can it persist in respect to
minimum wages in the face of the claim recognized in the West
Coast Hotel Company case, that a legal distinction between
wages and hours cannot be sustained?
CHILD LABOR

The law prohibits transportation in interstate commerce
of goods produced by oppressive child labor.
As we have seen, however, this provision of the law is the
very one which the Supreme Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart
held to be invalid, as an interference with the rights of the
states.
Congress, therefore, has sought, in the Wage-Hour Act,
to effect a reversal of Hammer v. Dagenhart. If "federal control under the commerce power," which was there held not to
apply because manufacture was not commerce, and therefore
those engaged in manufacture were not engaged in commerce,
is hereafter held to justify the regulation of child labor, presumably it will be so held in deference to the plea that exclusion of products of unprotected child labor from interstate
commerce "is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce
'from burdens and obstructions." The statute evidently was
written with the presentation of that argument in prospect.
Whether the court will vary, on that or another ground, the
finding in Hammer v. Dagenhart, we shall only know when
the court has spoken.
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

No consideration of the constitutional hurdles which the
Wage-Hour Law must surmount would be complete without
discussing one which invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act. As the Chief Justice said in the Schechter case:
"The Constitution provides that 'All legislative powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States'
*
*
*
-The Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to
transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which
it is thus vested."
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The N. I. R. A. was fatally defective, as Mr. Justice
Cardozo said, for the reason that in that case "The delegated
power of legislation * * * is not canalized within banks
that kept it from overflowing. It is unconfined and vagrant.
* *

*"

The Wage-Hour Law delegates some powers to an Administrator who is appointed by the President. The Administrator is authorized to appoint an industry committee for
each industry engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce and the Administrator has power, in industries where circumstances warrant it, after consulting with
the Committee, to establish a lower rate, not less than 30c
per hour, below the 40c per hour rate fixed by the Act. The
Industry Committee and the Administrator are further authorized to establish reasonable classifications within the
industry for the purpose of fixing separate wage scales for
such classifications based upon local conditions, including
cost of living and production costs. The Administrator and
his subordinates are authorized to determine within certain
standards what constitutes "oppressive child labor prohibited
by the act." The Administrator is given broad power of
definition with respect to certain classes of employees exempt
from the provisions of the act. The question is whether the
delegation of powers to the Administrator is limited to the
application of standards contained in the law, that is, is the
delegated power confined "within banks that keep it from
overflowing?"
The objection will undoubtedly be raised
when the law comes before the court. The General 44 Hour
Week Law of Pennsylvania was recently declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of that state (Holgate Brothers
v. Bashore, 331 Pa. 255) on the ground that it contained
an unconstitutional delegation by the Legislature of its
powers, but the objectionable delegation seems to have been
in the fact that the schedules of working hours fixed by any
federal regulatory body were made the standard under the
Pennsylvania Law. It was for the same reason that the State
Recovery Act (Laws of 1933, ch. 781) was held unconstitutional in this State. Chief Judge Crane, speaking for the
majority of the Court of Appeals, said:
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"Stripped of all its verbiage, and narrowing these provisions down
to the real authority, we find that the Legislature of the State of New
York has turned over to the National Administrator the question of
determining whether there shall be price-fixing in New York State of
coal and what it shall be. The Legislature has left too many things to
be determined by other bodies to make this law constitutional." (Darweger v. Staats, 267 N. Y. 290, 304).
CONCLUSION

To repeat, what we have here to consider is an enactment
that is primarily concerned with economic policies to one
phase of which the Act is designed to give effect. It is not
my purpose to pass upon the merits of the Act, in its bearing
upon the public welfare, or to agree with or oppose this particular item of political policy. Our examination is restricted
to speculation whether the provisions of the Act will bear
the scrutiny of the law when they come to be tested in the
Supreme Court. If much of the consideration has turned
upon recent decisions of the Supreme Court, it is because the
expressions of the court in those cases indicates that the commerce clause is now regarded as having an extensile quality,
the farthest limits of whose expansion the court may not as
yet have announced. Five years ago, or even three years ago,
most of us would have been disposed to say that the law was
not within the power of Congress to enact, under the Constitution, in the light of decisions then taken as controlling. But
when we have before us the court's reversal of its own controlling decision in the Adhins case, and add to that its action
in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins at the last term, overruling Swift
v. Tyson, we have ample indication that the court has no
qualms about reversing even decisions that are century old. In
this situation, and in the light of the recent decisions that have
passed under review as being pertinent to the problems of constitutional interpretation, any one who would now give an
opinion that the Wage-Hour Act is not within the power of
Congress to enact must have more assurance than I have that
the Act will be declared unconstitutional when the Supreme
Court comes to pass upon it.
There can be no doubt that the question of who is and
who is not engaged in "the production of goods for commerce"
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will be many times posed for answer and will be productive
of much litigation; nor that the judicial ingenuity and resourcefulness of that great tribunal will be exhausted in answering the question.
There is, for example, the fact that goods produced in
one state and sold in another state are in competition with
goods produced and sold exclusively within a state. Will
this competition bring within the power of Congress the regulation of intrastate production, if the competition should
prove to the disadvantage of the part that is under interstate
regulation? This is by no means an idle inquiry. The power
of the Interstate Commerce Commission over interstate transportation rates has resulted in regulation by that Commission
of intrastate rates where such rates enable carriers to compete
on more favorable terms than those enjoyed by interstate
carriers. Manipulation of manufacturing, if it is shown to
affect the price of the article in interstate commerce, has been
declared a violation of the Anti-Trust Act. If price is adversely affected, as to articles in interstate commerce, by the
competition of articles that are only in intrastate production
and commerce, can we be quite certain that regulation under
the commerce power will not be resorted to? And if it shall
prove that the power of Congress can be and actually is
directed to the control of more and yet more matters heretofore
regarded as entrusted solely to local authority for regulation,
who is there that would venture to set limits to the process of
erosion, or define with certainty what remainder of power,
over what have been accepted as local matters, will remain to
the states?
In the measure whose bearings we have been considering,
the disposition of Congress in this respect is manifested in
ways that admit of only one inference. What we have next
to learn is whether the Supreme Court considers the perseverance of Congress, up to this point at any rate, consistent with
its powers under the Constitution. For that we must wait,
as we must wait, also, for indications as to whether the states
are concerned over the trend of events or are passively acquiescent. Time alone will tell.

